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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Suit by sellers under real estate contract for specific 
performance. Summons served by publication. Counter-
claim filed 5 years later but before default entered. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On motion by Plaintiff the Court dismissed the com-
plaint without prejudice and the counterclaim with 
prejudice over Defendant's objection. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek an order reversing the order of dis-
missal of their counterclaim and of Plaintiffs' complaint. 
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diction was acquired by publication of summons as pro-
vided in Rule 4(f) (1), URCP, but their failure to do so 
constitutes an extension by Plaintiffs of the time within 
which Defendants could plead. Sanders v. Milford Auto 
Co., 62 U. 110, 218 P. 126. The complaint having been 
filed and summons issued the action was commenced and 
was still pending at the time that Defendants filed their 
answer and counterclaim. Askwith v. Ellis, 85 U. 103, 
38 P. 2d 757. 
Rule 41 (b) provides for involuntary dismissal, upon 
motion of the defendant. The Defendants oppose dis-
missal and accordingly the Court was not authorized by 
that rule to dismiss this action on motion of Plaintiffs. 
Rule 41 ( c) makes involuntary dismissal under Rule 
41 (b) applicable to counterclaims, however no grounds 
specified in Rule 41 (b) are asserted by Plaintiffs in sup-
port of their motion to dismiss the counterclaim (and no 
such grounds in fact exist) and the Court was not justi-
fied in dismissing Defendants' counterclaim. 
Rule 41 (a) ( 2), URCP, specifies the only circum-
stances under which Plaintiff could obtain a dismissal of 
their action after an answer and counterclaim had been 
filed as in our case. That rule reads as follows: 
41 (a) (2) "By Order of Court. Except as provided 
in paragraph ( 1) of this subdivision of this rule, an 
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's in-
stance save upon order of the court and upon such 
terms and conditions as the court deems proper. If a 
counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior 
to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to 
dismiss the action shall not be dismissed against the 
' defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants purchased the Arrowhead Hotel in St. 
George, Utah, Aug. 25, 1961, on a real estate contract 
(R. 4-7). During May, 1962, Plaintiffs brought this suit 
for specific performance of the contract and judgment 
for unpaid interest installments, 1/;3 of 1961 property 
taxes, attorney fees and costs, alleging that Defendants 
were then in possession of the premises (R. 1-10) and in 
October, 1962, caused a receiver to be appointed to oper-
ate the hotel alleging that the property had been 
abandoned by Defendants (R. 11-13), and summons to 
be served by publication (R. 14-15). The receiver was 
discharged in February, 1964. No further action was 
taken in this matter by Plaintiffs until February, 1968, 
when Plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss (R. 37-41) 
after Defendants had filed an answer and counterclaim 
alleging unlawful detainer and conversion of personal 
property. Over Defendants objections the court dismissed 
both Plaintiffs' complaint and Defendants' counterclaim. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THIS 
ACTION 
Prior to the time Defendants filed their answer and 
counterclaim Plaintiffs would have been entitled to dis-
miss this action by filing a notice of dismissal as pro-
vided in Rule 41 (a) (1) (i), URCP, but was without right 
to dismiss suit thereafter. Rogers v. West, 82 U. 525, 25 
P. 2d 971. Prior to that time Plaintiffs could have taken ! 
judgment against the Defendants to the extent that juris-
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may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favor-
able to the Defendants. Martin v. Stevens, 121 U. 484, 243 
P.2d 747. Defendants' counterclaim states a claim for re-
lief upon which relief can be granted, if the allegations 
contained therein can be supported by evidence at a trial, 
and Defendants are entitled to their day in Court to 
present evidence in support of those allegations. De-
fendants' right to have their cause tried by the Court by 
Article I, Sec. 11 of the Constitution of Utah which reads 
in part as follows: 
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; ... " 
The order dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint over the 
objections of Defendants under the circumstances con-
stitutes an abuse of discretion by the Court. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS IS NOT AU-
THORIZED BY THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
AND THE COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR 
THAT MOTION OR TO DISMISS THIS ACTION 
Plaintiffs' affidavits and motion (R. 47-42) are based 
on alleged estoppel, which is an affirmative defense that 
must be pleaded in a responsive pleading, not by motion. 
Rule 12(b), URCP, lists the only defenses that may be 
asserted by motion. Estoppel is not one of the defenses 
available by motion and must be asserted as an affirma-
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remain pending for independent adjudication by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dis-
missal under this paragraph is without prejudice." 
(Emphasis Added) 
The above quoted rule limits the power of the Court 
to dismiss case at the request of the Plaintiffs and over 
the objections of Defendants to situations where Defend-
ants' counterclaim remains pending for independent ad-
judication by the Court. The Court was not authorized 
by Rule (41) (a) (2) to dismiss Defendants' counterclaim 
even if the court determined that a proper case existed 
for dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint. Baron & Holtzoff, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 2B, P. 120 and cases 
there cited. Since the Utah Rules were fashioned after 
the Federal Rules it is proper to examine decisions under 
the Federal Rules to determine the meanings thereof. 
Winegar v. Slim Olsen, Inc., 122 U. 487, 252 P.2d 205, 207. 
Plaintiffs' complaint requests that Defendants spe· 
cifically perform the contract between the parties. De 
fendants, by their answer and counterclaim, seek to en-
force their rights under that same contract and to com· 
plete their purchase of the Arrowhead hotel. No act or 
thing done by Plaintiffs has affected or terminated the 
rights of Defendants as buyers under said real estate 
contract. Defendants are entitled to litigate their rights 
under that contract. The fact that the Plaintiffs may have 
had a change of mind concerning the property is no just· 
tification for dismissal of Defendants' counterclaim. At 
most the grounds asserted by Plaintiffs would constitute 
a possible defense to the counterclaim. Defendants are 
entitled to have the Supreme Court review all of the 
evidence, together with every logical inference which 
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be asserted by a responsive pleading. Accordingly the 
Court had no jurisdiction to hear said motion or to dis-
miss this action pursuant to that motion. Defendants are 
entitled to their day in court to present evidence which 
Defendants believe will clearly establish that Plaintiffs 
could easily have contacted Defendants or their daughter, 
who had actually managed said hotel during a substantial 
part of the period during which this action was pending, 
and that no proper case for an estoppel in fact exists. 
The order dismissing this action should be vacated and 
set aside and the case remanded to the Court for trial on 
the merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ronald C. Barker 
Attorney for Defendants 
6 
tive defense in a responsive pleading to Defendants' 
counterclaim as specified in Rule 12 (b), URCP. Since the 
Plaintiffs' motion is not permitted under the Rules the 
Court cannot act thereon and the Court's dismissal of 
this action was and is beyond the jurisdiction and power 
of the Court. 
Defendants should be permitted to have their day in 
court and to present evidence and witnesses to establish 
that no estoppel is in fact available to Plaintiffs in this 
case; that during a substantial portion of the time said 
lawsuit has been pending the Plaintiffs in fact knew the 
address of and conversed with Defendants' daughter, who 
was the person who actually operated said hotel, and 
transacted business with Plaintiffs for and on behalf of 
the Defendants. 
SUMMARY 
Rule 41 (a) (2), URCP, permits a plaintiff to dismiss 
his complaint after an answer and counterclaim have 
been filed only by order of the court and only if the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent ad· 
judication by the court. Dismissal of Defendants' counter· 
claim is in direct violation of that rule and should be re-
versed. Dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint for specific per-
formance of the real estate contract was and is an abuse : 
of discretion by the court since the Defendants seek by 
their answer and counterclaim to perform that contract 
and to complete the purchase of the hotel. 
Rule 12 (b), URCP, lists the only grounds upon which 
a defense may be asserted by motion. Estoppel is not one , 
of the defenses that may be asserted by motion, but must , 
I 
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